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Money Laundering: Is It Now A
Corporate Problem?
William E Bruton, CFE*
Money laundering occurs in almost every crime where there is
a financial motive. People who commit most crimes have, at least
as one of their motives, personal enrichment. Because of the need
to hide the fact that wealth came from a criminal act, the criminals
need to disguise the money. This forms the basis of all moneylaundering and tax crimes. Completing the money-laundering
activity generally involves a series of transactions designed to
disguise the source of funds, so that these assets may be used
without discovery by law enforcement. Through the moneylaundering process the individual tries to transform the appearance
of the funds derived from the illegal activity into funds having
come from a legitimate source. There has been an emerging new
system of money-laundering where the use of legitimate commercial trade activity is being used by criminals involved in illegal
activity to disguise their criminally derived profits as coming from
legitimate businesses.
This new system of using trade to assist in their moneylaundering system may have far-reaching social consequences and
may even rise to the level of threatening economic policies. In
order for criminals to use trade and financial systems to complete
their activity, they must manipulate these trade and financial
systems for their own selfish ends.
In recent years, multi-national law enforcement investigations
have shown that criminal organizations are international in scope
and their criminal activities are utilizing financial institutions
worldwide. With the rapid advancement of the Internet and the
ability for individuals to use this vehicle to transfer funds and
wealth, criminal organizations are globalizing their use of financial
and trade industries. History has shown that as criminal groups
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start to use a legal system of any type, they start the process to
control and manipulate the system for their own use. Unchecked,
criminal groups could potentially control the means of capitol
production for a political entity.
Modern financial systems permit anyone to transfer large
amounts of dollars through computers and financial institutions.
Illegal moneys have been laundered through every available
method. This is only limited by one's imagination. Moneys have
been laundered through currency exchangers, stockbroker firms,
gambling houses, private banking facilities, offshore financial
institutions, wire transfers, and trade financing, all with the
objective to launder and hide the proceeds of illegal activity.
In recent years, money launderers have been receiving
assistance from professional individuals such as accountants and
lawyers. These individuals have been trained in the more sophisticated methods of investment and movement of wealth. Money
launders have an impact on national economies by moving millions
of dollars outside the normally regulated trade avenues. With this
type of activity, nations may not be able to monitor national fiscal
activities, levy taxes, collect customs import duties, and protect
local businesses from unfair competition.
As in many black markets, where products are considered
items with which to barter for value, the Colombian black market
considers any national currency to be a tradable commodity that
holds value. In order to understand the mentality of the peso
exchange you have to appreciate and understand that national
currencies are considered commodities to be exchanged and sold.
The black market peso exchange has evolved into an economic
system whereby the value of cocaine is traded for currency, and
that currency is traded/sold for another commodity (consumer
goods) or currency. The true ownership or title to the asset is only
known by a currency exchanger (in this case Colombia Peso
exchanger) who follows the transaction which is conducted in
another country (in this case the United States). This system has
been well documented both in testimony before the U.S. Congress
and in the U.S. Courts. The inability for a national government to
control this system of informal finances is well documented by the
Colombian Trade Commission.
By way of simple introduction, it is necessary to define, in
general terms, a basic working understanding of the Colombian
black market peso exchange. This particular black market
developed because of central government restrictions placed on
access to foreign currencies used in conducting merchant trade.
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Many black markets around the world start as a cottage industry in
response to pent-up demand for some type of goods or service, or
because of national economic or tax policies. In the case of
Colombia, in the purchase of foreign goods for resale, the retailer
must acquire U.S. dollars as a means to pay for goods from nonColombian manufacturers. Access to dollars by Colombian citizens
is regulated and administered by the central bank. This regulation
by the central government was instituted to ensure that Colombian
duties and taxes have been collected.
Because of the perceived over-regulation by the central
government, a system was established which presented retailers
with alternative means of paying for imported foreign goods. The
Colombian black-market peso exchange offers the retailer the
option of purchasing U.S. dollars, either outside government
control or through the central government. While utilizing the
Colombian black market the exchanger violates national laws. This
system, because of its appeal and acceptance, has become institutionally accepted. A further hideous byproduct of the black market
rests in the fact that the products purchased with black market
funds give the appearance and aura of being of a higher quality,
latest technology or a prestigious symbol. In essence, there has
been created a public perception that a product imported legally,
paid for through the national bank, and otherwise complying with
all tax and customs laws would, by its very nature, be inferior. This
perception, to some extent, is fostered by the black market itself,
in order to generate a demand for black market products in
deference to legitimately imported products. In essence, the desire
by the central government to control its economy and currency has
the opposite effect of creating an industry that has the converse
effect on the goals and objectives of a controlled economy.
In the case of Colombia, the black market in consumer goods
has existed for many years. It is only in the last 10 to 15 years that
the drug traffickers have seized upon the opportunity to utilize this
existing informal economic system. This is done in order to
repatriate their wealth earned in another national jurisdiction. It
is because this black market peso exchange system had become so
efficient in the payment for and the smuggling of goods and
currency that the drug trafficker has been able to enhance and
improve upon an already existing system. The sheer volume of
wealth involved in drug trafficking introduced into this black
market system has evolved into its own personality. The black
market system has matured into a financial system capable of
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controlling the fundamental basis of wealth with the potential to
manipulate the ownership of various segments of an economy.
The Colombian black market peso exchange system has
evolved into a four-step process, which relies upon an informal but
tightly controlled "trust" system to ensure its continued growth.
This system assumes an unlimited amount of currency and a desire
for goods and services. The following represents its most basic
components:
A system that can place currency into a monetary system or bank
(placement)
The ability to hide the source of the currency (layering)
The ability to convert original currency or wealth into
a currency of choice
The ability to deliver goods while concealing the
source of payments (integration)
In the United States, during the mid 1970s, Operation Leprechaun found that large boxes of currency were delivered to
financial institutions. The placement of drug dollars into the
monetary system of the United States was as simple as driving up
to the front door, opening your trunk and being assisted by bank
employees in depositing cash. The system of placing cash into the
bank was as uncomplicated as walking up, filling out a deposit slip,
and placing one million dollars in cash into an account, no
questions asked. Because this system violates no U.S. laws, moneylaundering statutes were instituted to disrupt this system of
currency placement. Congress passed the Bank Secrecy Act of
1970, which imposes a duty on financial institutions to file a
Currency Transaction Report (CTR) whenever a customer conducts
a financial transaction in cash exceeding $10,000.
In 1986, in an effort to combat organized criminal activity
Congress passed the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986. The
statute criminalized the movement of money and wealth derived
from specific unlawful activities. This law was designed, in part, to
prosecute those who are engaged in a "specified unlawful activity"
and those who are attempting to disguise the true source and
nature of their illegally gained wealth. The law also assists in the
seizing of the assets and profits of the specified unlawful activity.
During this time banks were the most efficient method of
moving large bulks of currency. As an example, a kilo of heroin
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weighs 2.2 lb., which is then converted to currency in U.S. dollars
of 5's, 10's and 20's weighing 10 times the original drug weight,
even as much as 256 pounds. While it may be easy to conceal 2.2
pounds, it becomes impossible, in the same fashion, to conceal a
package weighing 256 pounds. These figures are even more
dramatic when you consider that a single trafficker may earn as
much as $500 million in the United States from the sale of cocaine.
The weight of the illicit currency would exceed 125,000 pounds of
money. Because financial institutions routinely handle large
volumes of currency, it became a system of choice to use financial
institutions to convert this weight to either cashier's checks or wire
transfers.
With the enactment of money-laundering statutes, banks and
depository institutions became the first line of defense in penetrating and preventing drug traffickers from using our financial
institutions to aid in their criminal enterprises. The new moneylaundering statutes require financial institutions to strip the veil of
anonymity that was an essential element for money launderers.
The record-keeping system identifies depositors and allows the
government regulators to trace and identify money-laundering
groups. As a result of the identification, money-laundering groups
must move to different systems to avoid detection.
In 1994, DEA Administrator Thomas Constantine and IRS
Commissioner Margaret Richardson announced the close of
Operation Dinero, ending a two-year undercover drug moneylaundering operation coordinated between IRS and DEA. This
operation also had international law enforcement assistance from
the United Kingdom, Canada, Spain, and Italy. The investigation
culminated in the arrest of 116 suspects and the seizure of more
than a hundred million dollars in cash and nine tons of cocaine.
This investigation highlighted the need for international law
enforcement and regulatory agencies to cooperate in the investigation of international money-laundering rings.
Operation Dinero had two parts. The first part focused on
currency pickups, both domestic and international. It identified the
connection between Colombian drug trafficking and their money
cell groups in the United States. The second part focused on the
operation of a Class B bank established on the island of Anguilla,
British West Indies. Once the undercover bank began operation,
IRS and DEA undercover agents promoted the bank's services
within the domestic and international criminal communities.
This undercover Class B bank operated in the same manner as
any other offshore Class B bank. The undercover operation
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offered checking accounts, savings accounts, and wire transfer
services. While in operation it offered third party "Mexican
checks" for deposit. The Mexican checks came from currency
smuggled into Mexico and used to purchase cashier's checks from
Mexican banks that had U.S. correspondent accounts. These
checks were in U.S. dollar amounts and written by the Mexican
banks on accounts of their correspondent bank in the U.S. These
checks were written to Hispanic-sounding names and endorsed over
to our undercover bank. In addition, 300 million dollars in
securities maintained in Europe were purchased with drug dollars
in South America. The drug traffickers and peso exchangers
routinely sent the undercover bank U.S. dollar checks, wire
transfers etc. They then wrote checks on their account or wire
transferred the money to another domestic or international bank
account. With an analysis of the documentation surrounding the
funds coming into the account and disbursement from the account,
the U.S. government and the other governments cooperating in
this effort gained intelligence that led to supplemental investigations both domestically and internationally.
The Colombian peso exchange system has brought the ability
to hide the source of the illegal currency to the level of a fine art.
This exchange system uses two parallel financial transactions in
different countries. The exchange system starts with a drug
trafficker contacting a peso exchanger indicating that he had a large
sum of currency, for example in New York. In a separate transaction, a Colombian importer contacts a peso exchanger in Colombia
with pesos, stating that he needs U.S. dollars to purchase goods in
the United States, for example in Detroit. The currency exchanger
purchases the currency in New York for as much as a 15 percent
discount from the drug trafficker. He then "trades" the dollars for
pesos to the Colombian importer at the discounted black market
rate. The black market peso exchanger asks the drug trafficker
into which account he wants the pesos deposited. He then asks the
importer where he wants the dollars deposited in the United States
for payment of the purchased goods.
Drug dealers have an almost unlimited source of currency. It
has been estimated that the Colombia Drug Cartels may have
generated as much as 10 billion U.S. Dollars of profit which they
need to get back to their control. They need an efficient mechanism to deliver the profits to them in a means and method that
makes them available to enhance their wealth. The Colombian
businessperson needs U.S. dollars or other foreign currency in
order to purchase goods and services for resale by him in Colom-
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bia. The Colombian black market peso exchanger has analyzed the
needs of both of these parties. He has designed a system to alter
the way financial transactions are legally conducted and fulfills the
financial needs of both groups.
During the last seven years an important lesson has been
learned by law enforcement. Law enforcement has identified
criminal organizations that specialized in purchasing consumer
products with illegally derived cash and exporting this wealth
disguised as consumer products to South America. The movement
of illegally derived moneys, via the purchase of products, is not
limited to the United States. Drug organizations are utilizing this
system around the globe. Where there is strict monitoring of
financial transactions, criminal organizations are using the cash
generated from illegal activities, purchasing products and then
shipping/smuggling the products into another country. They are
selling the product at a discount, and utilizing the sale of the
smuggled products as justification for their enhanced life styles.
Law enforcement undercover operations have indicated that
major drug criminal organizations are utilizing warehouses in
Miami, Panama and Aruba to purchase consumer products with
drug dollars. This merchandise is then delivered through shipping
brokers to Colombia. In Colombia the products are then sold
below average retail price. This system has created a very high
demand for these types of sales.
On October 22, 1997, before the United States House of
Representatives, Subcommittee on General Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, Washington
D.C., an individual testified anonymously and stated the following:
"As a money broker, I arrange payments to many large
U.S. and international companies on behalf of Colombian
importers... These companies were paid with U.S. currency
generated by narcotics trafficking. They may not have been
aware of the source of this money. However, they accepted
payments from me without ever questioning who I was or the
source of the money. For two years, I acted as a money broker
in Columbia. I brokered both the illegally and legally obtained
dollars and pesos along with other licensed and unlicensed
money brokers. During this time, I brokered several million
dollars on behalf of the Cartel.
Upon my introduction to the business, I was amazed at the
large numbers of brokers. In Columbia, brokers often operate
in what can be described as a flea market atmosphere.
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Importers shop for United States dollars at the mall, traveling
from office to office to get the best black-market exchange rate.
The broker would be told which narcotics trafficker owned
the money in United States, whether or not they asked, to
instill the fear of reprisal into the broker so that they would not
steal or misappropriate funds.
I would like to offer my explanation of money brokerage.
As an example, a coffee broker in Colombia needs to purchase
a tractor from a United States tractor maker. He purchases the
tractor for 500,000 dollars. He receives a tractor in Columbia
but has pesos. He needs to pay the U.S. company in dollars.
So the grower takes the pesos to the black-market money
broker instead of using Colombian banks, because he can buy
the dollars at a lower rate and avoids taxes and tariffs of up to
20 percent.
The broker buys the 500,000 dollars in pesos from the
coffee grower and charges in a commission for his service. The
broker then approaches a financial representative of the Cartel
who has 500,000 dollars in drug money on the U.S. streets. The
broker buys the 500,000 dollars from the Cartel representative
and pays for it with the farmer's 500,000 dollars in Colombian
pesos, minus a commission he takes for getting the cash off the
Cartel's hands. The broker receives the dollars and uses them
to pay for the farm tractor in the United States. In this
manner, the farmer's debt is paid to the U.S. company, the drug
dealer has been paid pesos for his narcotics, and broker has
received a commission from both parties."
In a case such as that above, the actual flow of funds does not
move from system to system. Therefore, tracing and following the
money cannot be accomplished. The exchange system is started by
a narcotic trafficker or Cartel organization in Columbia shipping
drugs from Columbia to United States. The drugs are then sold for
cash. The cash is brought to the trafficker's representative in the
United States. The dollars are then accumulated in a stash house
until directed by the Cartel financial adviser to release the dollars
to a representative of the peso exchange system.
Under the peso exchange system, a Colombian businessperson
will approach a peso exchanger and request to purchase dollars in
the United States. The businessperson needs the dollars to pay for
products he wishes to purchase in the United States. The peso
exchanger would approach a "Duros," the financial representative
of the drug Cartel, and ascertain the amount of U.S. dollars
available on the black-market. If the official exchange rate is 1000
pesos per dollar, the peso exchanger would offer 800 pesos per
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dollar to the Duros. The exchanger would then sell the pesos to
the businessperson for 890 pesos per dollar, for profit of 90 pesos.
The businessperson would give the pesos to the currency exchanger, who would then deposit the pesos in a form requested by the
Duros. The businessperson would then be asked where he wished
the dollars to be transferred. Our experience has shown that these
transfers do not necessarily contain the name of the businessperson
in Columbia. The U.S. business(es) will then ship the requested
products to the Colombian businessman.
What makes this system difficult for law enforcement is the
fact that the communication between the two systems is done by
cell phone, fax and beepers. No books and records are maintained
in the U.S. for review by legal authorities. Once the transfer is
done there is no traceable record of the flow of funds. As
described in these two boxes in the above chart, the only overt
relationship between these two systems are shown by the shipment
of drugs to the United States and shipment of products from the
United States to Columbia. For years, law enforcement has
investigated using the philosophy of "follow the money." If one
were to follow the drugs coming into the United States, being sold
on the street, money going to the stash house and then deposited
to a bank account at the direction of trafficker in Colombia, one
would believe that the bank account where the dollars were
deposited may be owned by the narcotics trafficker. There have
been many investigations by the Department of Justice and U.S.
Treasury Department that have followed this trail and made the
assumption that they have found the bank accounts of the Colombian cartels. Further investigation showed that these accounts are
owned by U.S. businesses, which sold products to the foreign
businessperson and the dollars represented payment for these
products. The U.S. businessperson claimed to be the innocent
owner. In Operation Polar Cap, the U.S. Government froze over
700 bank accounts. The many owners of these accounts came
forward to assert the claim of innocent owner. The accounts were
then unfrozen when it could not be proven that the account owners
had "knowledge" of drug funds entering their account.
The businesses being utilized by the peso exchanger are not
limited to the United States. Investigations have shown that the
peso exchangers and narcotics traffickers utilize businesses in
whatever country they sell their drugs. We have been asked to
conduct money pickups for the drug Cartel and currency exchangers in Europe, Asia, and Russia. This indicates that
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businesses are capable of being used by the Cartels in any country
in which the Cartels sell their drugs.
During the last couple years I was asked by a U.S. business to
look at information from some of their bank accounts. This was
done at the request of the U.S. business to help them to identify
whether they were targeted by a money-laundering peso exchange
system. A review of their accounts showed the following:
1. They had received cashier's checks, which were credited to one
of their customer's account. These cashier's checks were issued
from a non-U.S. bank but were drawn on a U.S. dollar account
from a U.S. correspondent bank. The cashier's checks were issued
in various Hispanic names containing an endorsement on the back
of the check. In some cases there were several endorsements, none
of which contained the name of the customer to whose account
these checks were credited.
2. The account also contained wire transfers. The wire transfers
did not come from an account owned by the Colombian customer
of the U.S. business.
3. The account contained cash deposits, but always under the
$10,000 reporting requirement.
The U.S. business told me that this customer ordered the U.S.
products and shipped these to Aruba for sale. I also found that
this customer was arrested by U.S. law-enforcement for laundering
drug money, but not because of doing business with this company.
The Colombian Government Trade Bureau in Washington
D.C. has expressed to many law enforcement officials their
concern for the effect that the black-market exchange system is
having on their legitimate business people.
This concern can be best explained as follows:
Narcotics traffickers are continually concerned with the
Colombian government's attempt to eliminate their illegal activity.
A new law being enforced by Colombia is the illegal enrichment
law. The illegal enrichment law states that if income reported on
a tax return comes from an illegal source the tax rate will be over
50 percent. Narcotics traffickers are also concerned with estate
planning. Because of the drug traffickers' enormous wealth and
assets, they are attempting to enter into legitimate commercial
enterprises in order to give the appearance that their wealth is
derived from legitimate activity. They either create their own front
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companies or utilize businesses and other commercial entities to
repatriate the proceeds of their narcotics trafficking from an
underground economy. Narcotics traffickers want to be able to
become part of the "country club" set. Therefore, they have
started businesses and have taken over companies using their
narcotics proceeds to further the economic benefit of these entities.
Let us take a hypothetical example of how this process is
working. Imagine there exists five wholesale outlets for products
manufactured by ABC Corporation in Atlanta, GA. Four of these
outlets comply with all currency, tax and customs import duty laws.
The fifth outlet gets its' U.S. currency from the black-market,
imports its products illegally from Panama or Aruba and smuggles
them into Colombia.
The first four outlets import 1,000 products, paying $100.00
U.S. each. The narcotics trafficker has drug money in New York
with which to purchase his products. He is accustomed to paying
a peso exchanger a discount of 30 percent to place his narcotics
proceeds into a financial institution. He now has the ability to use
his drug money to purchase the products from ABC Corporation
in Atlanta, GA and smuggles them into Colombia in order to sell
them at his store.
The first four outlets, in order to make a profit, must sell the
products purchased from ABC Corporation in Atlanta, GA for
more than $100 each. The narcotics trafficker has already made a
significant profit on the sale of drugs and does not need to earn
any money selling products of ABC Corporation.
In fact, if he sells the product at the exact price he paid for it,
he will have already reduced his total business expenses by 15
percent. The 15 percent is the cost he would have paid the
currency exchanger to convert the dollars to pesos if he did not use
the purchase of products to get his drug money converted. The use
of front companies, where legitimate products are sold, offers
narcotics traffickers a tremendous advantage in legitimizing their
illegal underground wealth. If they were to move 100 million
dollars through this process each year, narcotics traffickers could
file tax returns showing the profits from this business. A narcotics
trafficker could visit with the "country club set" and say he was the
president of this very profitable organization.
What happens to the other four businesses that cannot
compete with the drug trafficker in selling ABC Corporation's
product for the same price? They're faced with only three
alternatives. Use the black-market and violate currency regulations, tax and Customs laws; go out of business or sell the business
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to the drug trafficker. Many of the businesses cannot compete with
the narcotics trafficker and his financial advantage. Therefore, the
narcotics trafficker starts to control the vast majority of the industry
within the circle he competes. Let's take our story one step
further. Now the narcotics trafficker has become the largest
purchaser of products from ABC Corporation. In order to
maintain an inventory level large enough to supply his newfound
South American vendors, ABC Corporation establishes a multimillion-dollar manufacturing facility in the Pacific Rim. This manufacturing facility employs several hundred people and has boosted the
economy of that area.
As the South American business market grows, it becomes
more important to ABC Corporation. After several years, ABC
Corporation will be asked by the narcotics trafficker for "special"
services to aid in the trafficking of drugs or the trafficking of illegal
currencies. This could be as simple as a request to borrow the
company plane when it comes to visit from the States or to carry
a package from the U.S. to Colombia. When ABC Corporation
says it will not participate, the drug trafficker says, "I will switch
from selling your product to selling a competitor's product within
two days." Now ABC Corporation, who has become financially
dependent on the South American vendor, finds itself on the horns
of a dilemma.
While only part of this story is true, if we do not take
corrective action the entire story may become a reality.
Conclusions
Corporations and businesses need to establish a "know your
customer" policy. These types of policies have been established for
several years by financial institutions in order to prevent criminal
groups from laundering drug dollars through their institutions.
Because of the success of this policy, drug organizations are moving
their drug profits through the use of international commerce. The
following is an example of some policies that would assist corporations:
1. Establish customer identification and documentation requirements.
2. Establish payment policies that require the payment to be
received from the established bank account in the name of the
customer.

1999]

MONEY LAUNDERING

449

3. Prohibit the use of third party checks for payment credited to
customers account.
4. Develop policies requiring the reporting of suspicious payment
activities.
5. Consider the establishment of a compliance officer who has
broad authority to monitor and insure compliance with relevant
laws. This is especially critical where products are being exported
to high-risk areas.

